Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
1. (C) Summary and Action Request. In a two hour conversation with Ambassador May 23, Chief of Army Staff General Kayani told Ambassador he was "desperate" for helicopter support as he had only five MI-17s operational. Kayani insisted that Pakistani technicians were capable of doing required helicopter maintenance. There are two ways for the Pakistani military to acquire additional helicopters relatively quickly: (1) a lease, and we understand a waiver to enable the USG to lease MI-17s now needs only congressional notification; and (2) procurement through Pakistan's FMF account, which also requires a waiver. We expect Pakistan to prefer the first option. Post acknowledges the frustration of dealing with the Pakistani military, but it is critical to our interests that they receive help as soon as possible to clear Swat and move on the Waziristans, the heart of cross-border operations against U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Post recommends that we request expedited congressional notification of the MI-17 waiver. In the meantime, we continue to seek Cobra helicopter spare parts. End Summary and Action Request.
2. (C) In a two hour conversation May 23 (septel) Chief of Army Staff General Kayani told Ambassador he was "desperate" for helicopter support. He said he could not move against North and South Waziristan until he had more lift. At that moment, he said he had five MI-17s operational. (This is a lower number than others have told us.) As has been previously reported, Kayani wanted U.S. support to lease MI-17 helicopters, and he needed spare parts for the Cobra helicopters. Ambassador said she wanted to "clear the air" about some of the offers of U.S. assistance that had gone unanswered, such as the helicopter maintenance contract and the ISR platform.
3. (C) Kayani said he did not need U.S. help on maintenance: the Cobras were twenty-five years old and had been maintained by Pakistani technicians. But he needed the U.S. Government to stop the constant stream of leaks from Washington. These always made it appear as if he were taking steps in response to U.S. demands. He said he had been successfully moving troops from the eastern border, but this was undermined by the drumbeat in the U.S. press that he was taking this action in response to U.S. demands. The U.S., he said, is always trying to press on him sophisticated U.S. systems, which the Pakistani military had neither the ability nor the funds to manage. Domestic political support for current combat operations would be eroded by a bigger U.S. military presence, he said.
4. (C) Embassy understands that the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) waiver that enables the USG potentially to procure or lease MI-17s has just been approved by the Department, and the only remaining hurdle is the Congressional notification. The notification process needs to be expedited. The Mission is considering options to assist Pakistan Army in procuring or leasing MI-17s. If the supplemental is passed, our preferred option is to use the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund (PCCF) to lease nine MI-17s. A U.S. controlled lease of this kind allows us to include necessary maintenance (which any contractor is likely to stipulate) and provides leverage over use of the helicopters in order to ensure the helicopters are applied in counter-insurgency activities. The nine MI-17s the Pakistanis have requested would be leased for the duration of ongoing overhauls of nine Pakistan Army MI-17s and would, in effect, be a 1-for-1 backfill of those helicopters in overhaul.
5. (C) Alternately, if the supplemental is not passed in time, the Mission can advise the GOP to use its FMF to buy or lease MI-17 helicopters. If the GOP chooses to use its FMF for this purpose, the Mission will need to obtain an Offshore Procurement (OSP) waiver from DOD, with State Department and Department of Treasury concurrence, and an agreement with the GOP specifying the conditions on how they intend to use these new MI-17 helicopters, The terms of the agreement will specify use of the helicopters in support of counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the Northwest Frontier Province, and portions of Balochistan. Further, if a purchase, the agreement will require a comprehensive
ISLAMABAD 00001119 002 OF 002
maintenance and logistics package in conjunction with the helicopters.
6. (C) Finally, we will require access to the helicopters above and beyond normal End Use Monitoring standards in order to certify the helicopters' use in COIN operations. The Mission's assessment is that because the Pakistan military has not forecast the use of FMF for helicopter procurement, the opportunity cost of using FMF to procure helicopters makes it unlikely that the GOP would choose to do so quickly. In any case, we are fully prepared to assist the Pakistan Army to address the maintenance issues of the MI-17 helicopters if it so desires. If, as General Kayani indicates, only five MI-17s are operational, we can produce the equivalent of 'new' helicopters by assisting the Pakistan Army to repair the helicopters that are non-operational.
7. (C) Other helicopters in Pakistan's aviation fleet face equally troubling operational readiness and availability issues. We are searching for and acquiring specific critical spare items for Cobra helicopters as quickly as possible, and have provided an agreement to resume work on eight Pakistani Cobras now in the U.S. Despite the urgency of the existing situation in the NWFP and FATA, we are waiting for the GOP to sign letters of agreement on Cobra spare parts.
8. (C) Comment: Embassy is aware that U.S. engagement with the Pakistani military has been frustrating. Transparency is often non-existent. Offers of assistance go unanswered or are overruled at headquarters, even as Pakistan's maintenance and training are inadequate. Still, the success of our own troop surge in Afghanistan and the stability of Pakistan's government depend on rolling back the terrorist threat in Swat and eliminating the terrorist safehavens in the Waziristans. The inability of the GOP to control North and South Waziristan has enabled terrorists to operate throughout the country. Kayani confided to an American visitor recently that he would not be able to move to Waziristan until late summer. While that movement will not be determined solely by the availability of helicopter support, it is certainly the case that the availability of helicopters will be a key factor in making the decision to go.
PATTERSON
US embassy cables: Pakistan army chief 'desperate' for US military support | World news | guardian.co.uk
1. (C) Summary and Action Request. In a two hour conversation with Ambassador May 23, Chief of Army Staff General Kayani told Ambassador he was "desperate" for helicopter support as he had only five MI-17s operational. Kayani insisted that Pakistani technicians were capable of doing required helicopter maintenance. There are two ways for the Pakistani military to acquire additional helicopters relatively quickly: (1) a lease, and we understand a waiver to enable the USG to lease MI-17s now needs only congressional notification; and (2) procurement through Pakistan's FMF account, which also requires a waiver. We expect Pakistan to prefer the first option. Post acknowledges the frustration of dealing with the Pakistani military, but it is critical to our interests that they receive help as soon as possible to clear Swat and move on the Waziristans, the heart of cross-border operations against U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Post recommends that we request expedited congressional notification of the MI-17 waiver. In the meantime, we continue to seek Cobra helicopter spare parts. End Summary and Action Request.
2. (C) In a two hour conversation May 23 (septel) Chief of Army Staff General Kayani told Ambassador he was "desperate" for helicopter support. He said he could not move against North and South Waziristan until he had more lift. At that moment, he said he had five MI-17s operational. (This is a lower number than others have told us.) As has been previously reported, Kayani wanted U.S. support to lease MI-17 helicopters, and he needed spare parts for the Cobra helicopters. Ambassador said she wanted to "clear the air" about some of the offers of U.S. assistance that had gone unanswered, such as the helicopter maintenance contract and the ISR platform.
3. (C) Kayani said he did not need U.S. help on maintenance: the Cobras were twenty-five years old and had been maintained by Pakistani technicians. But he needed the U.S. Government to stop the constant stream of leaks from Washington. These always made it appear as if he were taking steps in response to U.S. demands. He said he had been successfully moving troops from the eastern border, but this was undermined by the drumbeat in the U.S. press that he was taking this action in response to U.S. demands. The U.S., he said, is always trying to press on him sophisticated U.S. systems, which the Pakistani military had neither the ability nor the funds to manage. Domestic political support for current combat operations would be eroded by a bigger U.S. military presence, he said.
4. (C) Embassy understands that the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) waiver that enables the USG potentially to procure or lease MI-17s has just been approved by the Department, and the only remaining hurdle is the Congressional notification. The notification process needs to be expedited. The Mission is considering options to assist Pakistan Army in procuring or leasing MI-17s. If the supplemental is passed, our preferred option is to use the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund (PCCF) to lease nine MI-17s. A U.S. controlled lease of this kind allows us to include necessary maintenance (which any contractor is likely to stipulate) and provides leverage over use of the helicopters in order to ensure the helicopters are applied in counter-insurgency activities. The nine MI-17s the Pakistanis have requested would be leased for the duration of ongoing overhauls of nine Pakistan Army MI-17s and would, in effect, be a 1-for-1 backfill of those helicopters in overhaul.
5. (C) Alternately, if the supplemental is not passed in time, the Mission can advise the GOP to use its FMF to buy or lease MI-17 helicopters. If the GOP chooses to use its FMF for this purpose, the Mission will need to obtain an Offshore Procurement (OSP) waiver from DOD, with State Department and Department of Treasury concurrence, and an agreement with the GOP specifying the conditions on how they intend to use these new MI-17 helicopters, The terms of the agreement will specify use of the helicopters in support of counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the Northwest Frontier Province, and portions of Balochistan. Further, if a purchase, the agreement will require a comprehensive
ISLAMABAD 00001119 002 OF 002
maintenance and logistics package in conjunction with the helicopters.
6. (C) Finally, we will require access to the helicopters above and beyond normal End Use Monitoring standards in order to certify the helicopters' use in COIN operations. The Mission's assessment is that because the Pakistan military has not forecast the use of FMF for helicopter procurement, the opportunity cost of using FMF to procure helicopters makes it unlikely that the GOP would choose to do so quickly. In any case, we are fully prepared to assist the Pakistan Army to address the maintenance issues of the MI-17 helicopters if it so desires. If, as General Kayani indicates, only five MI-17s are operational, we can produce the equivalent of 'new' helicopters by assisting the Pakistan Army to repair the helicopters that are non-operational.
7. (C) Other helicopters in Pakistan's aviation fleet face equally troubling operational readiness and availability issues. We are searching for and acquiring specific critical spare items for Cobra helicopters as quickly as possible, and have provided an agreement to resume work on eight Pakistani Cobras now in the U.S. Despite the urgency of the existing situation in the NWFP and FATA, we are waiting for the GOP to sign letters of agreement on Cobra spare parts.
8. (C) Comment: Embassy is aware that U.S. engagement with the Pakistani military has been frustrating. Transparency is often non-existent. Offers of assistance go unanswered or are overruled at headquarters, even as Pakistan's maintenance and training are inadequate. Still, the success of our own troop surge in Afghanistan and the stability of Pakistan's government depend on rolling back the terrorist threat in Swat and eliminating the terrorist safehavens in the Waziristans. The inability of the GOP to control North and South Waziristan has enabled terrorists to operate throughout the country. Kayani confided to an American visitor recently that he would not be able to move to Waziristan until late summer. While that movement will not be determined solely by the availability of helicopter support, it is certainly the case that the availability of helicopters will be a key factor in making the decision to go.
PATTERSON
US embassy cables: Pakistan army chief 'desperate' for US military support | World news | guardian.co.uk
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